

Секция «Востоковедение, африканистика»

Coalitions on the Middle East natural gas market

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Abstracts

Middle East is one of the major exporters of oil and gas in the world. Currently, most of the literature on the economy of natural gas is focused on the analysis of current situation, and little attention is paid to evaluation of possible coalitions that players might arrange. This paper is dedicated to modeling real situation concerning Middle East exporters on the natural gas market. Using coalition game theory I forecast the possible coalitions among Middle East countries and estimate the future export of natural gas and LNG. For that purpose I make a program which models a coalition game which forecasts the possible coalition taking into account all existing capacity, market peculiarities and political discrepancy among the countries. I find a measure of "disutility" that players suffer from cooperation with other countries. I also provide a sensitivity analysis where I discuss the importance of the imposed assumptions. Using genetic and cultural distances as the measure of "disutility" the model predicts plausible cooperation between Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman and UAE. The forecasts show that LNG export will increase, while Middle East economy will mostly develop in the way of increase in gas consumption and rely on the revenues from oil or export gas via pipeline, thus such countries as Indonesia, Malaysia and especially Australia can overthrow Qatar from the LNG leader exporter position.

Conclusion

Concluding the paper, despite several strong assumptions made in the model, three out of six instruments, which did not count directly such important factors as politics, religion and hostility among countries, results in quite reasonable outcomes. The most plausible coalition is Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Oman and UAE. Genetic, cultural and even linguistic measures of countries "disutility" show themselves as good instrument of costs that countries bear in coalitions with each other.

Qatar can unite with other countries that can increase slightly its LNG capacity. But according to the model forecast, Middle East economy will develop in the way of increase in gas consumption and mostly rely on the revenues from oil or export gas via pipeline, thus such countries as Indonesia, Malaysia and especially Australia can overthrow Qatar and its coalition from the LNG leader exporter position. But in a five year perspective Qatar and its coalition can be regarded as oligopolistic and the idea of GECF as a price setting organization is plausible.

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